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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j).
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The parties disagree about the issues that were presented and preserved below
and are properly raised on appeal, particularly with respect to the appropriate
standard of review. See e ^ , Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition. Appellee
Riverton City (the "City35) therefore restates the issues herein as follows:
A.

Issues and preservation.

The first issue properly presented and preserved is whether the trial court
correctly determined that the legislative decision by the Riverton City Council to
deny a third-party's application to rezone the subject property was not arbitrary,
capricious or illegal under the "reasonably debatable53 standard that applies to such an
exercise of legislative discretion under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a801.
The City preserved this issue by its motion for summary judgment and
supporting papers. R. 123-272. Petitioners and Appellants (collectively the
"Petersen Family55 or "Appellants55 herein) expressly conceded that this was the
central issue at oral argument on the City's motion:

1

MR. GARDINER:
First of all, Your Honor, I agree that the
standard is reasonably debatable and that the controlling cases are the [Bradley
v.] Payson City cases. I came prepared anticipating that I would have this
difficult challenge.
Transcript of Hearing, R. 446 at p. 4.
The second issue properly presented and preserved is whether the district
court correctly denied the Petersen Family's motion for discovery pursuant to Utah
R. Civ. P. 56(f), and limited its review of the City's land use decision pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801 to the record of the legislative proceedings before the
City. The Petersen Family preserved this issue by moving for a continuance
pursuant to Rule 56(f). R. 288-91.
The other issues the Petersen Family describes and argues at some length,
including: whether "the reasonably debatable criteria set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-801(3)(b) and § 10-9a-102 violate [sic] due process because it [sic] is so
vague that it does not constitute any standard of review at all55 (Aplts.3 Br. at 2);
whether Bradley v. Payson City, 2003 UT 16 "should be overturned based, in part,
on Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(3)(a)(i)» (id at 3, 23-24); and whether the district
court incorrectly applied the substantial evidence standard in this case to a decision
on a single parcel rezone application (id. at 17-23); were not presented to or decided

2

by the district court. R. 446 at p. 4 (CCI agree that the standard is reasonably
debatable and that the controlling cases are the [Bradley v.] Payson City cases.55).
B.

Standard of Review.

cc

When reviewing a city council's decision not to change the zoning

classification of property, the Court presumes that the decision is valid and
'determines only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.555
Bradley v. Payson City. 2003 UT 16 K 9, 17 P.3d 1160 (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-1001(3) (1999)). With respect to the issues properly raised, the principal
issue whether the City's decision not to change the zoning classification and a parcel
of property was reasonably debatable based upon the evidence in the legislative
record is a legal issue which the Court reviews for correctness. I d
This court reviews the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for an abuse of
discretion. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, If 29,16 P.3d 540.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's
land use decision made under this chapter, or under a regulation made
under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the
person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal
Authority and Variances, if applicable.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in
the exercise of or in violation of the provisions of this chapter may file a
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petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30 days
after the local land use decision is final.

(3) (a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation
made under the authority of this chapter is valid; and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision,
ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of
legislative discretion is valid if it is reasonably debatable that the
decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter
and is not otherwise illegal.
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority
is valid if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record
and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the
decision, ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or ordinance
in effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or
regulation adopted.

(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case
may be, shall transmit to the reviewing court the record of its
proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a
true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape
recording is a true and correct transcript for purposes of this Subsection
(7).
4

(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is
limited to the record provided by the land use authority or appeal
authority, as the case may be.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence
outside the record of the land use authority or appeal authority, as the
case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority
or appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was
improperly excluded.
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take
evidence.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(2005).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a land use case arising out of the City's exercise of its legislative
discretion to deny an application to rezone an approximately 21 acre parcel of
property (the "Property") which belongs to the Petersen Family. The Property is
situated in, and largely surrounded by, the City's rural residential zoning district
(ccRR-22ff), which allows for the keeping of large animals and no more than two
residential lots per acre.
The Petersen Family had apparently entered into an agreement to sell the
Property to a third-party developer, but the sale was conditioned upon the City's
approval of an application to rezone of the Property to an R-3 residential zone

5

designation, which would allow higher density development of three dwelling units
per acre and prohibit large animals. When the City denied the rezone application,
the developer declined to purchase the property, and the Peterson Family initiated
this action.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

The Petersen Family commenced the action by filing a "Petition for Judicial
Review of a Land Use Decision,53 and did so explicitly pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9a-801. R. 1-36. The Petition challenged the City Council's decision to deny
a third-party developer's application to rezone the Property from RR-22 to R-3 to
allow for greater development density on the Petersen Family's Property, and did so
on the grounds that "[tjhere was no substantial evidence to support the City
Council's land use decision, which was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore,
invalid." I d at 5. The Petition asserted no other claim or cause of action, and for
relief requested only that the court reverse the decision of the City Council and
require the City to grant the rezone petition. I d
In response to the Petersen Family's Petition and as required by section 10-9a801, the City compiled the record of the proceedings before the City on the rezone
application, which included certified transcripts of public hearings held before both
the City Planning Commission and City Council, and submitted that record to the
6

district court. R. 137-272. Based upon the record, the City moved for summary
judgment upholding the City Council's decision declining to rezone the Property.

Id
In support of its motion, the City pointed out that the "substantial evidence55
standard as evoked by the Petition did not apply. Id. at 131-34. Rather, a decision
on an application for rezoning is fundamentally a policy-based, legislative action
afforded a high degree of deference and upheld on judicial review as not arbitrary or
capricious if it is "reasonably debatable53 that the decision promotes policy goals and
objectives in furtherance of the general health, safety and welfare. Id, Because there
was adequate evidence in the record supporting the decision to deny a change in the
Property's zoning, including public comment opposing the change and the fact the
Property was surrounded on three sides by properties with the same existing zoning
designation or designations allowing an even lesser density, the City was entitled to
judgment dismissing the Petition. Id.
The Petersen Family filed a memorandum opposing the Cit^s motion, and
also filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f) for a continuance to allow for
discovery on certain issues. R. 298-386; 288-91. In doing so, the Petersen Family
did not explicitly challenge the "reasonably debatable55 standard as unconstitutional
or contrary to case law, but instead argued that the "substantial evidence55 standard
7

was dictated by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701 because the City Council was an
"appeal authority" under that statute. R. 320-21.
The Petersen Family argued the district court should overturn the City
Council's decision because it was not supported by "substantial evidence," was based
on an erroneous conclusion concerning spot zoning made by a member of the
Planning Commission, and was illegal because it allegedly violated the Petersen
Family's rights to equal protection and due process. R. 320-31. The Petersen
Family also argued they should be allowed to do discovery to support their
"information and belief the City's denial of the application was motivated by an
intent to devalue the Petersen Family's Property so the City could purchase it for a
reduced price, and other issues. R. 288-89.
In reply, the City pointed out: 1) that Bradley v. Payson City, 2003 UT 16 1F1f
11, 36,17 P.3d 1160, held that a decision on an application for rezoning was
fundamentally legislative in nature and therefore subject to the reasonably debatable
standard of review; and 2) that section 10-9a-701 did not apply because the
Planning Commission was a recommending body only and so the City Council was
not an "appeal authority." R. 395-408. The City argued that the Petersen Family^s
characterizations of the record did not establish that the City's decision was less than
reasonably debatable because the decision maintained a zoning designation on the
8

Property that was consistent with the immediate neighborhood and was also
consistent with the City's General Plan. I d The City went on to argue that the
City's decision was not illegal on constitutional grounds, and the Petersen Family's
discovery motion was not well-taken because Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801
specifically limits judicial review to the record presented to the City Council. Id
The district court held a hearing on the parties' motions. R. 421. At the
beginning of the hearing, the district court announced its tentative conclusions, as
follows:
In ruling on a motion and ruling on an appeal from
a decision by a city council denying a request to change a
zoning ordinance, I can only intervene on appeal if the
decision of the city council was arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.
The statute further clarifies that if the decision of
the city council involves the exercise of legislative
discretion, I can only reverse the decision if it is not
subject to reasonable debate or if it could not e the subject
- if it's not reasonably debatable.
It would be my conclusion in this case that the
action of the Riverton City Council was done pursuant to
their legislative discretion. Mr. Gardiner has pointed out
to me part 7 of the tide dealing with land use planning.
That title only deals with requests for variances and
[appeals of] decisions applying the land use statute. This
is a different circumstance. This is a proposed change to
the land use statute, and therefore, it is purely a legislative
function. So I can only reverse the decisions of Riverton
9

City Council if it is no - if their conclusion is not
reasonably debatable.
Secondly, I agree with Riverton City in this matter
that I can only consider the record that was provided by
the land use authority. For that reason, it would not be
appropriate or useful at this stage for me to permit
discovery because I would not be able to consider the
results of any discovery as part of this appeal.
So what that leaves you, Mr. Gardiner, is a fairly
difficult job I would think at this stage. As long as the
decision of the Riverton City Council was at least
reasonably debatable, I have to affirm that decision. The
decision that the Riverton City Council made was
consistent with its General Plan. The zoning that they
decided to allow to remain in place is similar to the zoning
that surrounds the property on at least three sides. Those
facts alone make that decision at least reasonably debatable
in my judgment. The fact that the[re] were things stated
in the record, even by the decision makers that now appear
not to be correct doesn't in itself change the outcome. As
long as the decision was at least reasonably debatable, I
have to affirm it. And so that's where I am, at least in
terms of tentative ruling.
R. 446, pp. 2-3.
In response, the Petersen Family's counsel conceded the standard of review:
MR. GARDINER:
First of all, Your Honor, I agree that the
standard is reasonably debatable and that the controlling cases are the [Bradley
v.] Payson City cases. I came prepared anticipating that I would have this
difficult challenge.
R. 446, p. 4.

10

The district court ultimately granted the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment and dismissed the Petersen Family's Petition for Review. R. 422-25. In
doing so, the district court reasoned, in pertinent part:
. . . [The court] has a very limited role in reviewing this
challenge to the exercise of legislative discretion by the
Riverton City Council on a petition for review which is
subject to the highly deferential, reasonably debatable
standard. The Court can only consider the record of
proceedings before the City which has been provided by
the City pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801, and it
is not appropriate to permit discovery under these facts
and circumstances. The record of proceedings indicates
that the application to rezone the property was consistent
with the General Plan, but so is the existing zoning. In
addition, the property in question is surrounded on three
sides by similarly zoned property.
I d at 2.
Within thirty days, the Petersen Family then filed this appeal. R. 433-35.
C.

Response to The Petersen Family's Statement of Facts.

Pursuant to section 10-9a-801 the City provided the district court with the
record of the proceedings before the City concerning its decision to deny the subject
rezone application, and brought a summary judgment motion as the procedural
vehicle for the Court to review that record pursuant to the standards set forth in
section 10-9a-801. R. 123-272. In opposition before the district court and in their
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brief on appeal, the Petersen Family set forth their own contrary characterizations of
the record and additional record excerpts. R. 298-386
Where, as here, the record is complete and includes transcripts of proceedings,
the fact that the parties may ask the Court to draw very different inferences based on
their respective characterizations of the record is not sufficient to defeat the City's
motion. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(b)(ccA decision, ordinance, or
regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is valid if it is reasonably
debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the purposes of this
chapter and is not otherwise illegal.55). That such differing characterizations are
possible may itself evidence a "reasonably debatable55 quantum of evidence. The
record establishes the bases for the City's decision and the Cit^s legislative decision
must be upheld if the record itself reflects a reasonably debatable decision, regardless
of the Petersen Family's characterizations. I d
In this regard, the facts the Petersen Family describes in their brief are not all
facts in the record which was presented to and considered by the district court, and
particularly do not include facts supporting both the City Council's and the district
court's decisions. Certainly the Petersen Family makes no attempt to marshal all the
evidence in the record to demonstrate that the decision is not supported by
"substantial evidence55 as they would be required to do even if "substantial evidence55
12

were the appropriate standard of review, which it is not. See Patterson v. Utah
County Bd. of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 604 n. 7 (Utah 1995) (ccIt is incumbent
upon the party challenging the Board's findings or decision to marshal all of the
evidence in support thereof and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light
of conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings and decision are not supported
by substantial evidence.")(citations omitted).
In support of its position on appeal, the City submits herewith the facts
supporting the City Council's decision, with citations to the record submitted to the
district court, as they were provided to the district court below:
1.
Petitioners are the trustees of a trust which owns the Property
consisting of 20.84 acres located at 12175 South 3600 West in the City. Pet.
111; Rezone Application, Appendix (ccApp.5?) Exhibit ("Ex.") 1.
2.
The Property is situated in an area the City has zoned Residential
RR-22. Pet. 11 2; App. Ex. 1. The RR-22 zone permits 2 dwelling units per
acre and large, medium and small farm animals, and ccis established to provide
a residential environment within Riverton City that is characterized by low
density single family housing, a minimum of vehicular traffic and quiet
neighborhoods favorable for family life/3 Riverton City Code § 12-220, App.
Ex.2.
3.
The parcels adjoining the Property on the North and East are
also zoned R-22. App. Ex. 1; Zoning Map, App. Ex. 3. The parcel
adjoining the Property on the South is zoned R-l Residential. I d The R-l
zone allows one dwelling unit per acre and large, medium and small farm
animals, and "is established to provide a rural residential environment within
Riverton City that is characterized by large single-family houses, a minimum

13

of vehicular traffic and quiet neighborhoods favorable for rural family life.53
Riverton City Code § 12-215, App. Ex. 4.
4.
The parcel adjoining the Property on the West is zoned R-3
Residential. App. Ex. 1; App. Ex. 3. The R-3 zone allows three dwelling
units per acre and is ccto promote conditions favorable to medium-low density
residential living. . . . The R-3 zoning district is to provide areas for single
family residential neighborhoods on medium and smaller sized lots without
animal rights, allowing for a variety of housing styles.55 Riverton City Code
§ 12-230, App. Ex. 5.
5.
On or about May 11, 2007, a developer [D. R. Horton]
submitted an application requesting that the City rezone the Property from
RR-22 to R-3. Pet. 11 6; App. Ex. 1. The City Planning Commission held a
public hearing to consider the rezone request on June 14, 2007. Pet. II 8;
Planning Commission Minutes, App. Ex. 6; Planning Commission Transcript,
App. Ex. 7.
6.
At the hearing, the Planning Commission discussed the zoning
applicable to the Property and surrounding parcels and the purposes of the
zones. App. Ex. 7, pp. 3-5. The commission also reviewed the City's General
Plan, and noted that the General Plan designated the Property and certain of
the adjoining parcels as medium density residential, which was consistent with
the R-3 zoning designation sought by the applicant. I d pp. 5-6; General
Plan, App. Ex. 8.
7.
The Planning Commission asked if the applicant wanted to
"come up and propose this rezone," to which the applicant stated: ccNot
much to say. Pretty straight R-3.55 App. Ex. 7, p. 6. The planning
commission then entertained public comment on the application. No
comments were made in favor of the rezone, and several persons opposed the
change. I d pp. 7-14.
8.
Persons commenting on the application expressed concerns
about conflict with large animals, particularly horses, kept in the existing
community, buffers between the parcels with larger lots and the Property,
construction access, preservation of the rural character of the area, and
14

potential impacts from increased traffic which would result from greater
density. I d
9.
The commission deliberated and discussed the concerns
expressed. Id pp. 14-23. For example, one commissioner noted, in pertinent
part:
. .. My final question was regarding the borders
here, the two properties north and south of the - the two
subdivisions north and south having animal rights. I think
we heard from each of the neighbors that testified that
animal rights seemed to be an issue. And I think, you
know, weVe had this issue come before us a number of
times with animal rights and this issue of putting them
maybe in - you know, changing it from the RR-22, which
permits it, to an R-3, that doesn't. . . . [11] Because it's a
pretty big impact if we turn it from R-22 to R-3 if
everybody around it has animals. I think that's a big
impact.
I d p. 22.
10. Ultimately the Planning Commission voted to recommend denial
of the application on a motion by Commissioner Hansen:
I make a motion that we deny PL 07-4009 to
rezone [to] third acre lots. My personal opinion is that
would be spot zoning. If s in the middle of R-22 and R-l.
So I don't think it needs to be there.
I d pp. 23-24.
11. The City Council held a public hearing to consider the rezone
request on July 10, 2007. Pet. 1f 12; City Council Minutes, App. Ex. 9; City
Council Transcript, App. Ex. 10.
12. At the hearing, planning staff reported on the zoning applicable
to the Property and to the surrounding parcels, and discussed the purposes of
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the various zones. App. Ex. 10, pp. 3-5. Staff pointed out the General Plan
designation, and that the application was consistent with the General Plan.
Id. pp. 4-5. Staff also noted that the Planning Commission had
recommended denial of the application, and that cc[e]ssentially the Planning
Commission recommended that the property remain at its RR-22
designation.55 Id. p. 5.
13. The City Council then opened the hearing for public comment.
Again, no comments were made in favor of the rezone, and several persons
opposed the change. IdL pp. 7-12.
14. Persons commenting on the application expressed concerns
about the effect of the proposed change in density on the rural nature of the
area, the potentially increased number of homes and people, the potential
effect on water pressure and electrical power, and the potential the change
would increase traffic and require currently stubbed roads to be connected.
Id,
15. The City Council then closed the public comment portion of the
hearing and allowed a representative of the developer to address the Council.
Id. p. 14-15. That representative noted that there was some medium density
housing in the area, and that the rezone would not likely affect existing home
values. He acknowledged that traffic was a concern. He went on to calculate
that if the zoning were unchanged, only 15 or 16 lots could be developed. Id.
16. After some discussion, the Council voted unanimously to deny
the application to rezone the Property. I d p. 18.
17. On or about August 9, 2007, Petitioners filed their Petition for
Review of Land Use Decision. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801,
they seek this Court's order overturning the City's decision on the erroneous
basis there was no "substantial evidence55 supporting the decision and that it
"was arbitrary and capricious, and, therefore, invalid.55 Pet. MI 13-19.
Memorandum in Support of Riverton City's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.
126-131.
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One other portion of the Petersen Family's factual recitation merits comment.
Apparendy to support an inference that they were treated differendy than similarly
situated applicants, the Petersen Family asserts that:
27. On the very date that the Riverton City Planning Commission
recommended a denial of the Petersen Family's Application to rezone its land
from R-22 (one half acre lots) to R-3 (one-third acre lots), the Planning
Commission recommended rezoning property across the street to R-3.
(R. 17-18.)
28. The same day that the Riverton City Council denied the Petersen
Family's Application to rezone to one-third acre lots, the Riverton City
Council rezoned property across the street to allow one-third acre lots.
(R. 28-29, 241, 242)
Aplts.'Br. p. 15.
In fact, however, the minutes of the meetings the Petersen Family cites reflect
that the application on property "across the street" was actually a request to ccrezone
property . . . from C-PO [Commercial Professional Office] and R-3 to R-3 and
RM-8 [Residential Multifamily Eight Dwelling Units an Acre].55 R. 241. The
Planning Commission meeting minutes reflect that the property "across the street55
actually consisted of two parcels totaling 33.98 acres, and "the parcel adjacent to
Bangerter is zoned C-PO and other adjacent to 3600 West is zoned R-3.55 R. 17.
The Planning Commission minutes go on to reflect that the property "across
the street55 is "surrounded by R-3, a storm water management facility, Bangerter
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Highway, RR-22, R-3 and R-2.55 I d By contrast and as set forth above, the
Petersen Family's Property is surrounded on the North and East by parcels which are
also zoned RR-22 Residential, and property on the South zoned R-l Residential,
which allows only one dwelling unit per acre and large, medium and small farm
animals. See supra p. 11 HIT 2-3.
With respect to the "property across the street53 on 3600 West public
comment at the City Council meeting "supported the Planning Commission
recommendation to stay with R-3," rather than rezone to R-8. R. 241-42 (emphasis
added). See also id. (Alex Harmon . . . would like it to stay R-3.") The City's
decision on the application was to amend the designation on the two parcels from CPO and R-3, to R-3 only. I d
Thus the City did not in fact ccrezon[e] property across the street [on 3600
West] to allow one-third acre lots,55 as the Petersen Family asserts. Rather the City
removed a commercial designation on the Bangerter Highway parcel, but
maintained the existing, residential R-3 zoning designation on the 3600 West parcel.
In that respect and by maintaining the existing zoning and denying a request for a
higher density designation, the City treated the applicant for the property "across the
street55 the same way as it did the applicant on the Petersen Family's Property.
Moreover, the property ccacross the street55 is surrounded by properties that are both
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zoned and used differently than the properties surrounding the Petersen Family's
Property. Thus, that property "across the street53 is not similarly situated to the
Petersen Family's Property and the Petersen Family's characterizations of the record
are incorrect at best. Certainly the record does not support the bald assertions that
Appellants were treated differently than similarly situated persons or property
owners.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Petersen Family's arguments explicitly challenging the reasonably
debatable standard of review in the context of a single-parcel rezone were not
presented to the district court. Therefore they should not be considered here.
Moreover, such arguments fail on the merits.
For example, the argument that a decision on a single parcel rezone is
necessarily a quasi-judicial or administrative act is contrary to nearly a half century of
well-established precedent in Utah case law. Further, the argument ignores the
quintessentially legislative function and actions of the City Council in this particular
case. Here, the application required the Council to decide between two zoning
designations that were both consistent with the City's General Plan, and which
required the Council to weigh and consider public policy issues, neighboring land
uses, trends, and potential impacts on immediately surrounding properties.
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Applying the appropriate standard of review, the district court correcdy
upheld the City Council's exercise of legislative discretion in deciding not to rezone
the Petersen Family's Property from RR-22 to R-3 because it was not arbitrary or
capricious. The decision was at least reasonably debatable because: 1) both the
zoning density on the property as it currently exists and the zoning designation the
Petersen Family wanted to see applied by amendment were consistent with the City's
General Plan for the area; 2) the change in zoning was opposed by residents
appearing at the public hearings on the application who were particularly concerned
with compatibility with neighboring properties which had large animal rights; and
3) the zoning designation which the City Council decided to maintain was more
compatible with the less dense, more rural zoning designations on the majority of
properties which were immediately adjacent to the Petersen Family's Property.
Nor was the City Council's decision illegal as a violation of the Petersen
Family's constitutional equal protection or due process rights. Regardless of the
allegedly improper motivations which Appellants argue may have influenced the City
Council, there was an objectively rational basis for the Council's decision. Equal
protection review does not require more, nor allow an inquiry into individual
legislator's subjective motivations. No due process claim is viable because it is well
settled under these circumstances that Appellants had no right or entidement to a
20

favorable decision on whether or not to rezone the Property. Thus, the Peterson
Family did not have the necessary constitutionally protected property interest for any
alleged due process violation.
Finally, the district court correcdy denied the Petersen Family's motion for
discovery. They brought their Petition explicidy pursuant to section 10-9a-8015
which expressly requires that judicial review be conducted on the record of
proceedings before the City. Moreover, the Petersen Family failed to identify by
pleading or argument any viable constitutional claim to which such discovery would
be relevant. The district court's decision was correct in all respects, and should be
upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CITY'S DECISION WHETHER TO AMEND THE ZONING
DESIGNATION APPLICABLE TO THE PETERSEN FAMILY'S
20.84 ACRE PROPERTY WAS AN EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE
DISCRETION SUBJECT TO THE REASONABLELY DEBATABLE
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Despite counsel's explicit concession to the district court "that the standard is

reasonably debatable and that the controlling cases are the [Bradley v.] Payson City
cases/5 the Appellants5 primary argument on appeal is now that "the individual,
small-scale requests for a zoning change on a particular piece of property, such as is
at issue in this case, require a quasi-judicial determination and should be viewed
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under the substantial evidence standard." Aplts.' Br. p. 23. According to
Appellants, the Court's statement in Bradley v. Payson City, that "the enactment and
amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act," is not
"sustainable in light of the substantial Utah case law expressly distinguishing
between general, large-scale ordinances and policies and the small, individualized
municipal decisions." I d They go on to assert:
Utah Courts have routinely considered these small-scale,
individual decisions to be quasi-judicial in other contexts
and there is no basis for ignoring that distinction in the
zoning context. To the contrary, these are precisely the
types of decisions for which judicial oversight is strongly
needed.

Id
This new argument squarely attacking the standard of review and requesting
that this Court re-examine and overrule the Bradley decision is directly contrary to
what the Petersen Family explicidy conceded to the district court. R. 446 (CCI agree
that the standard is reasonably debatable and that the controlling cases are the
[Bradley v.] Payson City cases"). "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial
court may not be raised on appeal." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37
1f 20, 163 P.3d 615. "The rule exists cto give the trial court an opportunity to
address the claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it.'" I d (citations omitted). It
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also "prevents a party from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to
raise the issue on appeal if the strategy fails.53 I d See also Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT
41, P 15,164 P.3d 366 (cc[T]o preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to
rule on that issue.53 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus this Court should
respectfully decline to address Appellants3 belated challenge to the reasonably
debatable standard on appeal.
Even if the Court deems it appropriate to address the argument without the
benefit of the district court's consideration, it nonetheless fails on the merits for
several reasons. First, Appellants ignore the substantial and long standing precedent
in Utah case law, well prior to Bradley v. Payson City, which consistently treats the
decision whether to amend a zoning ordinance applicable to a single parcel of
property as a fundamentally legislative, not administrative or quasi-judicial, decision.
See, e.g., Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953)
(upholding City decision not to rezone a single parcel from residential to commercial
because cc[p]alpably the exercise of the zoning power is a legislative function and
activity.33); Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961)(refusing
to overturn decision not to rezone plaintiffs 18 acre parcel because cc[i]n pursuing its
authority to zone the county the Commission is performing a legislative function.33);
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Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1966)(upholding zone
change applicable to one-half city block as legislative action because "the court will
not invade the province of the Commission and substitute its judgment therefor; nor
will it interfere with the prerogatives of the Commission unless it is shown to be so
clearly in error that there is no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its
action55); Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P.2d 989 (Utah 1966)(upholding
decision not to rezone land next to freeway offramps as legislative decision because
"the courts do not ordinarily interfere in such matters'5); Crestview-Holladay
Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150,1152 (Utah
1976) (upholding rezoning decision applicable to one business property as rationally
related to legitimate goals as valid exercise of city's legislative discretion); Smith
Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah App. 1998)(City's decision
to downzone single 15.8 acre parcel upheld as reasonably debatable, legislative
action); Harmon City. Inc. v. Draper, 2000 UT App 31, 997 P.2d 321 (upholding
City decision to deny rezone application for single 10.3 acre parcel as legislative
action that was reasonably debatable); Webber v. South Salt Lake City, 2002 UT
App 208 (upholding denial of a rezone request for a single parcel and observing
cc

[w]hen reviewing a municipality's denial of a request for a zoning reclassification,

we consider whether it is 'reasonably debatable5 that the municipality's legislative
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decision serves cthe interest of the general welfare.553); Bradley v. Payson City, 2003
UT 16, 70 P. 3d 47 (upholding decison to deny rezone of a single parcel as
reasonably debatable legislative action); Tolman v. Logan City, 2007 UT App 260,
167 P.3d 489 (upholding decision to deny rezone applicable to plaintiffs5 single
property because the decision was consistent with the City's General Plan "and
satisfies the reasonably debatable standard for such land use decisions.55).
This line of cases recognizes that the legislative process involved in weighing
and considering the kind of public policy issues presented by a request to rezone a
particular parcel of property is inherently subjective and political in nature, requiring
local legislators to exercise broad discretion in balancing the competing interests of
all concerned in furtherance of the health, safety and general welfare of the
community. The cases from other jurisdictions which Appellants do cite provide no
basis for disturbing this well-established precedent. Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City,
958 P.2d 245, 252 n. 9 (Utah App. 1998) ("With the wealth of Utah law on this
subject, we reject Sandy Hills5s attempt to import a different standard from a
different jurisdiction.55).1

*Even the cases cited by The Petersen Family themselves from other
jurisdictions do not support their position. As the Colorado Court noted in the
Margaolis case which the Petersen Family cites, and incorrectly characterize (Aplts.5
Br. At 22):
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Moreover, the Petersen Family's argument ignores both what it concedes to
be the controlling case law, governing statutes and the facts of this case. For
example, the Petersen Family admits, as they must, that "the determination of
zoning policy [is] properly vested in the legislative branch." See Aplts.' Br. P. 22
(citing Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988))(ccthe
determination of zoning policy is properly vested in the legislative branch"). In this
case, while it is arguable that the City's General Plan might also support the higher
density zoning the Petersen Family wanted applied to the Property, there is also no
question but that the current zoning, which the City Council determined not to

Arvada argues that a rezoning involving a small tract such as that rezoned in
the present case under review is more adjudicative or quasi-judicial, and thus
ought not be subject to referendum and initiative. We do not find such an
analysis persuasive. . . . [11] While decisions on "small" rezonings may
directly affect only a few people, such decisions may more properly be seen as
the setting of policy for the future. While rezonings occur more frequently
than initial zonings, they likewise tend to be permanent in nature. See Arnel,
supra, for a listing of California cases which hold rezoning of "small" parcels
of land to be legislative.
In view of the purposes for which the referendum and initiative powers
were reserved, and the nature of the acts themselves, we find that zoning and
rezoning decisions - no matter what the size of the parcel of land involved are legislative in character and subject to the referendum and initiative
provisions of the Colorado Constitution.
Margaolis v. Dist. Ct.? 638 P.2d 298, 304 (Colo. 1984).
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change, also falls well within the uses contemplated by the General Plan for that area
and is more consistent with immediately neighboring properties.
The choice by the City's legislative body between two alternative zoning
designations which are both contemplated by and consistent with the General Plan
is, by its very nature, a policy-based, legislative decision. Appellants point to no
evidence in the record of proceedings that the City Council took any "quasi-judicial"
action by applying fixed land use regulations which would somehow have dictated
the appropriate result in this particular situation. There are simply no facts to
suggest that the City Council's decision to maintain the existing zoning on a
relatively large, 20 plus acre parcel to be consistent with the majority of immediately
neighboring properties is anything other than a "determination of zoning policy []
properly vested in the legislative branch."
The Petersen Family's additional argument, that section 10-9a-701 implies the
"substantial evidence55 standard is appropriate because "the function of the City
Council in a one parcel rezone is substantively that of an appeal authority55 (Aplts.5
Br. pp. 23-24), is nonsensical. That section requires a municipality to establish an
"appeal authority55 to hear "requests for variances from the terms of land use
ordinances; and appeals from decisions applying land use ordinances,55 and provides
that in those circumstances the appeal authority shall act in a quasi-judicial manner.
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See Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-701(3) (emphasis added). Riverton City Code § 12130-025 establishes a Board of Adjustment which is empowered to hear precisely
these type of administrative matters. See Riverton City Code § 12-13-025(A.),
(B.).
By contrast, the controlling provisions of both state statute and Riverton City
ordinance specify that only the City Council has the authority to amend zoning
ordinances. See Riverton City Code § 12-200-010; Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-503.
The fact that the City Planning Commission is both empowered and required to
make a recommendation on such applications for rezoning to the City Council does
nothing to convert the rezoning decision itself into any sort of appellate,
administrative or quasi judicial proceeding like those that occur before Boards of
Adjustment. Both the proceedings contemplated by section 10-9a-701 and the
decisions made under authority of that section are administrative in nature, and if
anything that statute illustrates the legislative nature of decisions made by the
legislative body with respect to amendments of zoning ordinances.

28

II.

THE CITY'S DECISION WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR
CAPRICIOUS.
A.

Appellants3 Substantial Evidence Arguments fail.

Applying the erroneous, "substantial evidence'5 standard of review, the
Petersen Family first argues that the City's decision to deny the rezone application
was arbitrary or capricious because it was not supported by "substantial evidence.55
See Aplts.5 Br. at 24-27. They assert this is so because: 1) there were answers, in
many cases provided by City staffers or planning commissioners, to all of the
concerns raised by neighbors and others during the public hearings; 2) the City
Council considered the impact of a proposed larger, neighboring development in
connection with consideration of potential development of the Petersen Family's
Property; and 3) one of the planning commissioners stated his "personal opinion55
that approval of the application would constitute "spot zoning.55 Id. However,
these circumstances, considered separately or in combination, fail to make the City's
decision less than reasonably debatable.
Whatever additional information might have been considered or answers
provided to address questions raised, it is clear the record contains evidence that
would make the rezone of the property reasonably debatable. Both the zoning
density on the property as it currently exists and the zoning designation the Petersen
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Family wanted to see applied by amendment were consistent with the City's General
Plan for the area. All residents appearing at the public hearings opposed the rezone
based upon concerns about compatibility with neighboring properties which had
large animal rights. Finally, the zoning designation which the City Council decided
to maintain was more compatible with the less dense, more rural zoning
designations on the majority of properties which were immediately adjacent to the
Petersen Family's Property.
While Appellants correctly point out that there is also evidence that the
concerns expressed could be addressed or some information was incorrect, they do
not establish that the decision to maintain die less dense, more rural nature of the
Petersen Family's Property which it believed was more compatible with the
immediately surrounding properties was somehow arbitrary and capricious. As the
Court stated in Gayland v. Salt Lake County:
Even though it be true that information was presented at
the hearing which would have justified the Commission in
amending the zoning ordinance as advocated, it is also
true that the situation presented can be so viewed as to
point to the conclusion that the action taken was
reasonable and proper. Under such circumstances it was
not the prerogative of the court to substitute its judgment
for that of the Commission.
358P.2dat636.
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And although the Petersen Family expends considerable energy and argument
pointing out that one planning commissioner expressed his "personal opinion" that
rezoning the property would constitute "spot zoning35 and that opinion was
incorrect, the short answer to these arguments is that the comment simply does not
matter. As courts have long recognized:
Zoning agencies ordinarily conduct their proceedings with
some degree of informality and the reasons given by a
zoning authority, presumably composed of lay persons, to
justify its action need not be in a form to satisfy the
meticulous criterion of a legal expert.
Timber Trails Assocs. v. Planning and Zoning Common of Town of Sherman, 916
A.2d 99, 113 (Conn. App. 2007). Furthermore, as set forth above, the Planning
Commission only had authority to make a recommendation to the City Council,
which is the legislative body empowered by state statute and City ordinance to make
a final decision on a rezoning application.
Here, there is no evidence whatsoever that the City Council determined to
deny the rezone application based on an individual planning commissioner's personal
legal opinion about spot zoning. At most, the substance of the comment reflects the
reality on the ground that the property was largely surrounded by less dense, more
rural parcels than the zoning designation the Petersen Family sought. The City
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Council denied the application for these reasons, not because the City Council as a
body made a mistaken legal determination that the rezone would be "spot zoning.53
B.

Appellants5 reasonably debatable arguments also fail.

The Petersen Family then goes on to argue that the City's decision on the
rezone application was not "reasonably debatable53 even under the appropriate
standard of review because: 1) "it was motivated by the City's improper intent to
drive down the value of the Petersen Family's Property in order to acquire a portion
of it for a retention basin;53 and 2) "it was based on an erroneous legal conclusion.53
Aplts.5 Br. at 28. This argument also fails.
Whatever subjective motivations there may have been for the Cit^s legislative
decision do not dictate whether or to what extent the decision is reasonably
debatable. Indeed, as commentators suggest:
Except as they may be disclosed on the face of the act or
are inferrable from its operation, the courts will not
inquire into the motives of legislators in passing or doing
an act, where the legislators possess the power to pass or
do the act and where they exercise that power in a mode
prescribed or authorized by die organic law. Therefore,
neither the motives of the members of a municipal
legislative body nor the influences under which they act
can be shown to nullify an ordinance duly passed in legal
form, within the scope of their powers.
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Parol evidence as to the motives of legislators or officers,
protected by the rule of judicial refusal to inquire into their
motives, is not admissible. Furthermore, the courts recognize, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, a presumption of good
faith in the enactment of municipal legislation.
5 McQuillin Municipal Corporations § 16.89 (3d. ed.) (footnotes omitted).
In this case, and as more fully set forth above, the Petersen Family has not and
cannot negate the district court's conclusion that the City's decision to deny the
rezone application had a conceivably rational basis and is at least reasonably
debatable because the property is surrounded by less dense, more rural properties
which are consistent with the existing zoning and with the General Plan. Under
such circumstances, the Petersen Family's allegations concerning the City Council's
subjective motivation to "drive down the value55 and a planning commissioner's
comment about his ccpersonal opinion55 on spot zoning are irrelevant. I d Compare
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n, 539 U.S. 103,123 S. Ct. 2156, 2160,156 L. Ed. 2d 97
(2003)(cc[J]udicial review is cat an end5 once the court identifies a plausible basis on
which the legislature may have relied.55).
III.

THE CITY'S DECISION TO DENY THE PETERSEN FAMILY'S
REZONE APPLICATION WAS NOT "ILLEGAL."
The Petersen Family argues that the district court "erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of Riverton City on the Petersen Family's equal protection
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claims.53 Aplts.' Br. pp. 29 - 33. They make a similar argument with respect to
"summary judgment55 on "the Petersen Family's due process claims.5' I d pp. 34-38.
Neither argument is valid.2
A.

The City's Land Use Decision Did Not Violate Any Constitutional
Right to Equal Protection.

To establish that the City's decision could constitute some sort of equal
protection violation, the Petersen Family relies upon the "class of one" rationale
described in Village of Willowbrook v. Olecbu 528 U.S. 562,145 L. Ed. 2d 1060,
120 S. Ct. 1073 (2000), and Gardner v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2008 UT 6,178
P.3d 893. Aplts.' Br. pp. 29-30. Based upon evidence that the City Council knew
the City was in negotiations to acquire a part of the Petersen Family's Property for a
detention basin, the Petersen Family argues:
In this case, there is evidence of dissimilar treatment
by the City and an allegation, with some evidentiary
support, of malicious or bad faith intent on the part of the

2

The short answer to these arguments is to point out that the Petersen
Family's complaint is a straightforward "Petition for Judicial Review of a Land Use
Decision" which they expressly filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801.
R. 1-36. Nowhere in that pleading did the Petersen Family even expressly assert
that the City's decision was illegal, let alone allege any cause of action grounded in a
constitutional equal protection or due process violation. I d Obviously, therefore,
the district court did not explicidy grant "summary judgment in favor of Riverton
City on the Petersen Family's" non-existent constitutional claims. See Summary
Judgment and Order of Dismissal, R. 422-25.
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City. The Petersen Family was intentionally treated
differently than other similarly situated individuals
applying for a zoning change because of the City's bad
faith intent to lower the value of the Petersen Family's
Property in an effort to obtain the Property at less than
market value for use as a detention pond.
Aplts.' Br. P. 31. These arguments fail for several reasons.
First, the City's decision can give rise to no equal protection violation because
regardless of alleged ill-will, malice and dissimilar treatment, the Olech equal
protection review requires only a rational basis for the challenged decision. Olech,
528 U.S. at 564 (recognizing a plaintiffs right to bring an equal protection claim as
a "class of one, where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.") (emphasis added). See also Gardner v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 2008 UT 6,1f 39 (reviewing class of one claim and noting that cc[a]n
equal protection claim that, as here, does not involve a fundamental right or a
suspect class is subject only to rational basis review.3').
As the Tenth Circuit recently explained:
The paradigmatic "class of one" case, more sensibly
conceived, is one in which a public official, with no
conceivable basis for his action other than spite or some
other improper motive (improper because unrelated to his
public duties), comes down hard on a hapless private
citizen. Perhaps he is the holder of a license from the state
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to operate a bar or restaurant or other business, and the
official deprives him of a valuable property right that
identically situated citizens toward whom the official bears
no ill will are permitted the unfettered enjoyment of. As
one moves away from the paradigmatic case, the sense of a
wrong of constitutional dignity, and of a need for a federal
remedy, attenuates.
TicariUa Apache Nation v. Rio Arriba County, 440 F.3d 1202, 1209 (10th
Cir.2006) (quoting Lauth v. McCollum, 424 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir.2005)
(emphasis added).
By the same token, where there is evidence of a rational government basis for
the challenged decision, then the class-of-one claim fails as a matter of law regardless
of allegations of malice, ill-will or improper governmental motivation. As the Tenth
Circuit noted in Ticarilla:
Even if subjective ill will is a necessary condition for a
class-of-one claim, it is not a sufficient one. If there was
an objectively reasonable basis for the Defendants1 actions
in this case, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on that
ground without allowing further discovery on the question
of subjective ill will.

TicariUa. 440 F.3d 1210-11. See also Flying T Inc. v. City of New Haven, 549 F.3d
538, 547-48 (7th Cir. 2008):
[Allegations of animus do not overcome the presumption
of rationality and the court evaluates those allegations
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once a plaintiff has pled facts that show the irrationality of
the government action in question. This standard reflects
the fairly intuitive idea that a given action can have a
rational basis and be a perfectly logical action for a
government entity to take even if there are facts casting it
as one taken out of animosity. It is only when courts can
hypothesize no rational basis for the action that allegations
of animus come into play. For instance, the classic
example of irrational government action in a class of one
equal protection case in this circuit is ccan ordinance
saying: "No one whose last name begins with "F" may use
a portable sign in front of a 24-hour food shop, but
everyone else may.555 What makes the ordinance in the
example irrational is not simply the act of singling out, but
rather that the singling out is done in such an arbitrary
way. Another example, tailored to the present case, would
be a zoning ordinance saying that any corporation whose
name begins with CCF" may not construct any development
larger than a half-acre in size.

. . . As outiined above, however, such allegations of
animus are only considered once the plaintiff has pled
sufficient facts to demonstrate the irrationality of the
government action that the court is asked to evaluate. By
not pleading such facts, Flying J is unable to establish a
class of one equal protection claim.
(Citations omitted).
Applying these principles here, the Petersen Family's equal protection
argument fails because they have not and cannot negate the district court's
conclusion that the City's decision to deny the rezone had a conceivably rational
basis. The Petersen Family's Property is largely surrounded by property designated
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with the existing zoning, and that zoning is consistent with the City's General Plan.
Preserving a parcel of property's relationship with the surrounding properties
provides a conceivably rationale basis for the City's decision. See Nordlinger v.
Hahn. 505 U.S. 1,12, 112 S. Ct. 2326,120 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992)("[t]he State has a
legitimate interest in local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability35)).
See also Tolman v. Logan City. 2007 UT App 260, H 18, 167 P.3d 489 (noting that
cc

a municipality's land use decision is reasonably debatable, and not otherwise

arbitrary or capricious, where it is made to effectuate an objective set out in the
municipality's general plan.").
When there is a rational basis for the City's decision, it does not give rise to an
Olech class of one equal protection claim regardless of the alleged malicious or
improper motive of the City Council. ccUnder the rational basis test, if there is a
plausible reason for the legislative action, our inquiry is at an end." U.S. v. Castillo,
140 R3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) (punctuation omitted); Fitzgerald v. Racing
Ass'n, 539 U.S. 103,123 S. Ct. 2156, 2160,156 L. Ed. 2d 97 (2003)(cc[J]udicial
review is cat an end' once the court identifies a plausible basis on which the
legislature may have relied.").
Moreover, cc[t]he requirement that a plaintiff show that similarly situated
persons were treated differendy cis especially important in class-of-one cases.'"
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Ticarilla, 440 F.3d at 1212. A plaintiff must demonstrate similarity "in all material
respects," and "cannot prevail if there is any material difference between it and
allegedly similarly situated parties that relates to a governmental interest." IdL at
1212-13. This is an onerous burden. See, e.g., id. ("when the class consists of one
person or entity, it is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that any difference in
treatment is not attributable to a quirk of the plaintiff or even to the fallibility of
administrators whose inconsistency is as random as it is inevitable"); Neilson v.
D'Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005)(class-of-one plaintiff must show that
"no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff to differ from
those of a comparator to a degree that would justify the differential treatment on the
basis of a legitimate government policy").
In this case, the Petersen Family did not and cannot make this showing. As
set forth above, the two properties the Petersen Family points to for purposes of
comparison, while "across the street" from one another, were both surrounded by
differendy zoned and situated properties and uses, and are not similar "in all material
respects." Moreover, the City decided to maintain the then existing zoning
designations on both comparative rezone applications, and thus did not treat the
applications materially different. The Petersen Family^s equal protection argument is
invalid.
39

B.

The City's Land Use Decision Did Not Violate Any Constitutional
Right to Due Process.

Proving any constitutional due process violation requires that the Petersen
Family establish a protectible property interest in the decision on the rezone
application. Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council 226 F.3d 1207,1210 (10th
Cir. 2000)(cc[T]o prevail on either a procedural or substantive due process claim, a
plaintiff must first establish that a defendant's actions deprived plaintiff of a
protectible property interest.55). See also Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT
App 11,1117, 155 P.3d900, 906:
To prevail on a due process claim, a party must first
establish that it has a "protectible property interest.5 This is
an interest in which one has ca legitimate claim of
entitlement.5 It is not "an abstract need for, or [a]
unilateral expectation of, a benefit." Rather, it is a "right
to a particular decision reached by applying rules to facts."
(Citations omitted).
In Hyde Park, the court went on to note:
The entitlement analysis centers on the degree of
discretion given the decisionmaker and not on the
probability of the decision's favorable outcome. To
prevail, [the plaintiff] must therefore demonstrate that a
set of conditions exist under state and local law, "the
fulfillment of which would give rise to a legitimate
expectation" that the City Council would approve
[plaintiffs] plat. In other words, [the plaintiff] must show
that under the applicable law, the City Council had limited
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discretion to disapprove the proposed plat." Otherwise,
the city's decisionmaking lacks sufficient substantive
limitations to invoke due process guarantees.53
Hyde Park, 226 F.3d at 1210 (citations omitted).
Here, however, Appellants can point to no City ordinance or General Plan
provision that limited the City Council's discretion in considering the rezone
application. On the contrary, and as the district court noted, both the existing
zoning and the zoning the Petersen Family desired were consistent with the General
Plan. And state law affords the City great discretion in determining whether to
grant or deny a rezone application:
In general, because a "zoning classification reflects a
legislative policy decision," we will not interfere with that
decision "except in the most extreme cases." The guiding
principle behind our interpretation of legislative zoning
decisions is that we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the municipality. Though a municipality may have
a myriad of competing choices before it, "the selection of
one method of solving the problem in preference to
another is entirely within the discretion of the [city]; and
does not, in and of itself evidence an abuse of discretion."
The propriety of the zoning decision need only be
"reasonably debatable."
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16,11 24, 70 P.3d 47, 54 (emphasis added).
The Petersen Family recognizes the protected-property interest requirement,
and attempts to satisfy its burden in this regard by reliance on Nasierowski Bros.
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Investment Co. v. City of Sterling Heights. 949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1991). Aplts.5
Br. pp. 34-35. Appellants argue that:
Here, as in Nasierowski, a protectable property
interest arose in favor of the Petersen Family when the
purchase of the Petersen Family's property was expressly
conditioned on the City's representations to D. R. Horton
that the Petersen Family would obtain a favorable zoning
decision from the City and in the time and effort expended
in seeking the rezoning of the property. The
"understandings" between the parties regarding die
rezoning of the property created constitutionally protected
property interest in approval of the zoning application.
Aplts.5 Br. pp. 35-36. However, even a cursory examination of the facts in the
Nasierowski case exposes the fallacy in the argument.
As the Sixth Circuit described Nasierowski:
In the case at bar, Nasierowski actively pursued and
completed a course of action of an inarguably substantial
character in an effort to construct a retail and warehouse
development on the property. First, and perhaps
foremost, he expressly conditioned the purchase of the
property on his obtaining a favorable zoning opinion from
the City. It is clear that Nasierowski would not have
purchased the land unless the City had first advised him
that, as of right, he was authorized to develop the parcel
along the proposed lines. The acquisition of the land was,
in and of itself, a substantial act undertaken exclusively
upon the City's approval and affirmative encouragement of
the proposal.
Second, Nasierowski expended considerable money
and effort in drafting a site plan, submitting it to the City
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for preliminary approval, petitioning the City for a
variance from the specific site plan requirements, and
negotiating with the City's planners and engineers in an
effort to resolve minor disputes over relatively insignificant
matters. These substantial undertakings bear only a vague
resemblance to the modest efforts of the landowner in City
of Lansing, who in 1927 "went no farther than to order
the plans and cause a survey to be made of the lot.53 The
expenditure of the plaintiff in City of Lansing, in contrast
to Nasierowski's in the case at bar, was correcdy deemed
too modest to give rise to a vested property interest.
Thus, Nasierowski had a property interest in the old
zoning classification within which his development was
permitted. That property interest was securely vested by
Nasierowski's engagement in substantial acts taken in
reliance, to his detriment, on representations from and
affirmative actions by the City.
Nasierowski Bros., 949 F.2d at 897. Thus the plaintiffs in Nasierowski were
expressly told by the government that the land they were considering for purchase
had certain entidements, the plaintiffs actually did purchase the property in reliance
upon the existing entitlements and the representations concerning those
entitlements, they spent substantial sums in developing the property pursuant to the
existing entitlements, and the government then eliminated or substantially reduced
those entitlements, allegedly without affording due process.3 I d

3

The Petersen Family also cites Moreland Properties v. Thornton. 559 R
Supp. 2d 1133 (D. Colo. 2008)(Aplts.5 Br. 35), which had similar facts. There the
plaintiff had purchased the subject property and undertaken development efforts
based upon the existing zoning and representations concerning that zoning from
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In this case, by contrast, and contrary to the Petersen Family's
characterizations, there was no purchase of any property nor any development efforts
undertaken based on the City's representations concerning the existing zoning. On
the contrary, a third-party developer, D. R. Horton, offered to purchase the Petersen
Family's Property if the existing zoning were to be changed. The developer, who is
not a plaintiff, then submitted an application for a zone change, but did not purchase
the property or undertake any development efforts whatsoever in reliance on any
representation concerning a zone change. There is no allegation or evidence that the
Petersen Family, who are the parties asserting a due process violation, took any
action at all. The City then did not downzone or otherwise reduce the entitlements
on the property in any way, but simply declined to change the zoning to allow
greater densities than those allowed on surrounding properties.

government officials, and the City defendant had then downzoned the property
allegedly without affording due process. 559 F. Supp. at 1149. The Moreland court
expressly distinguished cases where an applicant alleged a protected interest in the
outcome of a process designed to change a land use classification, like this case. Id.
citing TTR 1 LLC v. Mt. Crested Butte, 160 P.3d 365, 369-71 (Colo. Ct. App.
2007) (finding no property interest in the outcome of a building permit application
procedure where the procedure affords the municipality broad discretion to grant or
deny the permit); Hillside Cmty. Church v. Olson, 58 P.3d 1021, 1027-29 (Colo.
2002) (finding no property interest in outcome of special use permit application
hearing where the municipality had discretion to deny the permit even after the
hearing).
44

Thus both the Nasierowski and Moreland cases the Petersen Family has cited
are completely inapposite. The Petersen Family has not and cannot cite any case or
other authority which has recognized a property interest in the result of the City's
rezone decision like the one at issue hear sufficient to establish a constitutionally
cognizable due process violation. This Court's observations in Patterson v.
American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d 466, are applicable:
Many courts have held that adverse municipal land-use
decisions are not actionable under § 1983 because a
developer does not typically have a claim of entitiement to
a favorable decision. In Tacobs, Visconsi &: Tacobs Co. v.
City of Lawrence. 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991), the
plaintiffs argued that denial of their rezoning request
deprived them of their substantive due process interest in
"making reasonable use of their property free from
arbitrary and capricious restrictions imposed" by the city.
The Tenth Circuit noted that the city had considerable
discretion because the zoning statute prescribed a
"reasonableness" standard for the city's refusal to rezone
the property as requested by the developer. Given such
discretion, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the developer
could not point to any "'rules or mutually explicit
understandings that [would] support [their] claim of
entitlement' to the rezoning of their property."
Patterson, 2003 UT 7,11 24 (citations omitted).
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IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE
PETERSEN FAMILY'S REQUEST TO DO DISCOVERY.
Citing Springville Citizens v. Springville City. 1999 UT 25, If 13, The

Petersen Family argues that cc[f]aced with facially sufficient allegations that the City
violated the Petersen Family's constitutional rights," the court "must consider
matters outside of the record, and discovery outside of the record is therefore
appropriate and necessary35 regardless of the limitations imposed by section 10-9a801. Aplts.5 Br. p. 39. This argument also fails.
The Springville Citizens opinion simply commented that discovery had
occurred, and did not even address the question presented here. Springville Citizens,
1113. The fact remains that the Petersen Family sought judicial review pursuant to
section 10-9a-801, and that statute couldn't be more clear:
cc

[i]f there is a record, the district court's review is limited
to the record provided by the land use authority . . . . [11]
The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside
the record of the land use authority or appeal authority, as
the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the
land use authority or appeal authority, respectively, and
the court determines that it was improperly excluded.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-91-801(8).
Moreover, in this case there are no "facially sufficient allegations55 of any
constitutional violation. The Petersen Family's equal protection claim is subject to
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rational basis review and fails because there is a conceivable rational reason for the
City Council's rezone decision, regardless of what discovery could show about some
subjectively improper motive. Similarly, the Petersen Family's due process claim fails
because the Petersen Family had no constitutionally protected property interest in a
decision whether to grant greater development densities or not.
Discovery is not appropriate where further factual development would not
assist the Petersen Family in avoiding summary judgment. Holmes v. American
States Ins. Co., 2000 UT App 85, If 27, 1 P.3d 552 ("Because the Petersen Familyfs
claims fail as a matter of law, there was no need to allow further discovery.55);
American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech. Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996)
(because facts the plaintiff sought to discover would not be legally relevant to the
resolution of the issues, the denial of the plaintiffs motion to continue discovery was
proper).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the City respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the district court's judgment and order in favor of the City on the Petersen
Family's Petition for Review.
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